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Abstract—In recent years we have seen an upsurge in terror
attacks around the world. Such attacks usually happen in
public places with large crowds to cause the most damage
possible and get the most attention. Even though surveillance
cameras are assumed to be a powerful tool, their effect in
preventing crime is far from clear due to either limitation in
the ability of humans to vigilantly monitor video surveillance
or for the simple reason that they are operating passively.
In this paper, we present a weapon detection system based
on an ensemble of semantic Convolutional Neural Networks
that decomposes the problem of detecting and locating a
weapon into a set of smaller problems concerned with the
individual component parts of a weapon. This approach has
computational and practical advantages: a set of simpler neural
networks dedicated to specific tasks requires less computational
resources and can be trained in parallel; the overall output of
the system given by the aggregation of the outputs of individual
networks can be tuned by a user to trade-off false positives
and false negatives; finally, according to ensemble theory, the
output of the overall system will be robust and reliable even
in the presence of weak individual models. We evaluated our
system running simulations aimed at assessing the accuracy
of individual networks and the whole system. The results on
synthetic data and real-world data are promising, and they
suggest that our approach may have advantages compared to
the monolithic approach based on a single deep convolutional
neural network.
Index Terms—weapon detection, firearm detection, firearm
segmentation, semantic segmentation, physical security, neural
networks, convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the report ”Global Study on Homicide
2019”, published by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), more than 464,000 people across
the world were killed in homicides in 2017, accounting
for more than five times of the number of people killed in
armed conflict. Moreover, excluding homicides of unknown
mechanism, more than half (roughly 54%) of homicides
worldwide in 2017 were perpetrated with a firearm, and
slightly more than a fifth (22%) were perpetrated with a
sharp object [1]. The use of technology in law enforcement
and crime prevention is developing rapidly. For example,
video surveillance technology has been proved useful in
aiding investigators either to identify new suspects related to
a crime or to bolster evidence against current ones. In some
cases, video footage can be a decisive piece of evidence
in the course of a trial. Current video surveillance systems
(also known as CCTV) are generally operating passively
[2], which indicates that related authorities usually become
aware of a crime event postliminary. For example, CCTV
operators or police officers review a video footage only
after a crime occurred. In addition, in cases where video
surveillance technology is used for real time monitoring as
a way of deterring potential crimes, an agent would have
to visually detect the presence of weapons in the monitored
scenes and make decisions in a very short time. Any delay
or miscalculation in the decision making process of an
agent could be detrimental and result even in loss of human
lives. One of the most effective solutions to this problem is
to enhance surveillance cameras with Artificial Intelligence
(AI), where an accurate proactive crime-fighting tool can be
used to detect and consequently prevent weapon crimes.
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, we
apply the concept of semantic decomposition to the problem
of detecting a weapon; that is, we reduce the holistic
problem of detecting a whole weapon to the subset of
smaller, semantically-related problems of identifying the
different component parts of a weapon. Second, we apply
and evaluate this approach on a weapon detection system that
we developed using deep Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) for detecting individual parts of a firearm in images
and videos.
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The proposed method can be used in several applications,
such as for real-time detection of weapons in places where
video surveillance is available or needed (e.g., airports,
stadiums, other public places), for control purposes (e.g.,
in the case of videos or images uploaded to social media
containing graphics with weapons), and for complementing
other current security technologies (e.g., metal detectors that
can detect weapons concealed on an individuals body).
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents
background information and related work. Section III for-
malises the goal of our research and our approach to solving
the problem of weapon detection via machine learning.
Section IV analyses the dataset generation protocol for our
study, while Section V provides details about the model
we implemented. Section VI presents different simulations
conducted for validating our model and assessing its per-
formance. Section VII discusses some ethical implications
related to our work. Finally, Section VIII concludes our work
and outlines future developments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Security
No region in the world is exempt from the dramatic
consequences of firearms violence. The problems associated
with firearms violence covers the whole spectrum of human
security: ranging from high levels of individual physical
insecurity (domestic and street violence, gang and criminal
violence) with severe economic and social consequences for
the society at large, to large scale armed conflicts in which
these arms enable widespread violence and account for the
majority of deaths.
B. Machine learning
Machine learning provides a set of methods and tech-
niques for inferring patterns and relations among data.
Supervised learning is the task of learning a functional
relationship between a set of data and a semantic class.
Given a set of samples x as vectors, where each of the
vectors is associated with a label y, the aim of a machine
learning algorithm is to discover a function f : x 7→ y that
associates every sample to its label [3].
A popular family of algorithms for supervised learning is
neural networks, which constitute universal approximators
that can be effectively trained by backpropagation. Con-
volutional Neural Networks, in particular, are a sub-set of
neural networks designed to process two-dimensional inputs
and be invariant to translations; these networks can be used
to process images and to carry out tasks such as image
detection or image segmentation.
The availability of large amounts of data and compu-
tational power has recently fostered the development of
deep learning algorithms, that is, the use of layered neural
networks able to learn complex functions [4]. In particular,
the success of deep CNNs on several image recognition tasks
[5] has made these models a common choice for solving
problems of image recognition, detection and segmentation.
Starting from the simple pixel representation of an image,
deep CNNs automatically discover robust and increasingly
higher-level features that can be used to solve challenging
problems in image recognition and segmentation [6], [7].
C. Related work
The problem of weapon detection in videos or images us-
ing machine learning is related to two broad research areas.
The first research area focuses on addressing weapon de-
tection using classical computer-vision or pattern-matching
methods, whereas the second research area focuses on im-
proving the performance of object detection using machine
learning techniques.
• Weapon detection: The majority of methods used for
weapon detection are based on imaging techniques,
such as infrared imaging [8] and millimeter wave
imaging [9]. The most representative application in this
context is luggage control in airports.
• Object segmentation models: Object segmentation
consists of recognizing an object and finding its loca-
tion in the input image. The existing methods address
the segmentation problem by reformulating it into a
classification problem; first a classifier is trained, and
then, during the detection process, filters are run on
a number of areas of the input image using either
the sliding window approach [10]–[12] or the region
proposals approach [13]–[16].
Standard machine learning approaches based on deep
convolutional neural networks have also been used to try to
solve the problem of detection and segmentation at the same
time [17], [18]. However, to the best of our knowledge this is
the first work focusing on firearm detection and segmentation
using an ensemble of small semantic neural networks.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper, we tackle the problem of detecting the pres-
ence of weapons within an image. We cast this problem as
image detection/segmentation supervised learning problem:
we want to learn a function that given an image as input
returns the presence and the location of the weapon. Fol-
lowing the state of the art, we decided to use convolutional
neural networks to learn such a function.
Weapon detection presents some peculiar and significant
challenges. First of all, one of the main drivers of deep
learning, that is the availability of data, is weak in this
specific application domain. Differently from other standard
image recognition problems that can exploit the availability
of large standardized public datasets, we can not rely on
similar resources. For this reason, we decided to collect and
develop our own dataset (Section IV).
We also decided to consider a possible limitation on
the other drive of deep learning, that is the availability of
significant computational resources. To face this constraint,
we decided to exploit common prior semantic knowledge
about weapons: since any modern firearm is composed of
different identifiable parts, we decided to decompose the
overall problem of detecting a single weapon in a set
of smaller problems concerned with the detection of the
individual component parts of the weapon itself. We thus
instantiated a set of small convolutional neural networks,
each one solving the simpler problem of detecting a specific
component part of a weapon, and aggregated the results in a
robust output (Section V). The individual networks are faster
to train, requiring less computational resources and can be
easily parallelized.
Training a set of smaller and potentially weaker learners
finds justification in ensemble theory. It is well-known
that simple weak learners (i.e., modules whose accuracy is
just above a random chance threshold) may be effectively
aggregated in ensemble modules whose accuracy is stronger
than the individual learners [19]. This principle informs our
hypothesis that aggregating potentially weak learners in the
form of small dedicated networks detecting specific parts of
a weapon may not only guarantee a computational advantage
but also produce an ensemble system that is more robust and
reliable than a single deep network.
IV. DATASET GENERATION
Due to the lack of comprehensive image libraries for
firearms, we created a custom dataset. We decided to focus
on a single specific type of rifle, AR-15 style rifle. The
choice was made considering the popularity of this firearm
in the Western part of the world, accessibility of the source
images and visual diversity of different models with core
features being preserved. It is worth noting that this type of
firearm in addition to other rifles was used in terror attacks
(mass shooting), such as in New Zealand in 2018 [20], in
Las Vegas, USA in 2017 [21] and in Orlando, USA in 2016
[22]. We identified four essential component parts: barrel,
magazine, butt-stock and upper-lower receiver assembly (see
Figure 1).
Fig. 1: Main components of AR-15 rifle.
To generate positive instances for our dataset we queried
the Google images service and retrieved 4500 instances of
pictures depicting AR-15 rifles. We first processed these
images manually, generating and classifying 2500 samples
for each component part. Following the standards [3], we
partitioned samples into training (2000 samples), validation
(400 samples) and test (100 samples) sets; we then aug-
mented our training dataset through synthetic manipulations
(e.g., rotation, shearing, and scaling) to increase the total
number of training samples per part to 8000. To generate
negative instances, we reused the initial source set of 4500
images and extracted random samples that explicitly do
not contain any firearm parts, such as background details,
humans, clothing and miscellaneous items present in the
source images (see for an example Figure 2).
Fig. 2: An illustrative example of the stock and a negative
sample.
In total, we have five datasets, one for each component
plus one composed of exclusively negative examples; all the
images add up to 42500 samples. Each picture is 200×200
pixels.
V. SEMANTIC SEGMENTATION MODEL
One of the main contributions of this work is the semantic
decomposition of the detection problem. Instead of directly
solving the challenge of detecting a weapon, we developed a
system that relies on the identification of its parts. Breaking
down the problem of identifying a weapon into the problem
of identifying its components simplifies the problem at hand:
it provides a divide-and-conquer approach to solve a high-
level problem through the solution of a set of smaller similar
problems. Moreover, in this case, it also offers a simple way
to deal with situations where firearms are partially concealed,
lack certain distinct features or are modified.
We implement a modular array of convolutional neural
networks1. All the networks have the same architecture:
three convolutional layers for feature extraction and three
dense layers for binary classification (see Figure 3 for refer-
ence). In the convolutional section, we use layers containing
32 or 64 filters with default stride of 1x1, with ReLU
activation functions, and 2x2 max-pooling. In the dense
section, we use fully connected layers. We use a ReLU
1All models are implemented using Keras (https://keras.io/) and Tensor-
flow (https://www.tensorflow.org/)
activation function, except for the last layer where we rely on
the softmax function to compute the output. Moreover, in the
second-to-last layer, we use dropout [23] with a probability
p = 0.5 for regularization. The relatively small architecture
allows for faster parallel tuning and training.
Fig. 3: Neural network architecture.
At runtime, in order to process an image of arbitrary size,
a simple iterative algorithm based on a sliding window is
used to generate cropped images of the required input size
of 200× 200 pixels.
We take the output of each network to carry equal weight
towards the final detection decision, each one contribut-
ing 25 percent certainty about the presence of a firearm.
However, the mechanism to aggregate each output in a
final decision can be easily changed by the developer of
the system by tweaking the contribution weight of each
component of the weapon and the number of components
that should be detected before raising an alert: in sensitive
and critical situations, the system can be configured to
raise a firearm detection alert whenever a single component
part is identified; in less critical scenarios, the sensitivity
(and, relatedly, the number of false positive detections)
may be lowered by requiring the identification of multiple
component parts before raising an alert. Notice, also, that
a developer may easily decide to instantiate and aggregate
different custom-designed networks; the modular design of
our system allows for straightforward plugin and removal of
additional networks, whose output is aggregated in the final
decision.
Finally, to assess image segmentation, the outputs of the
individual networks are used to produce a heatmap and a
bounding box marking the region of the image where our
model returned a high positive activation, thus pinpointing
the location of the detected weapon in the image.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
A. Simulation 1: Quantitative assessment of the individual
networks
The first simulation assesses the performance of each
component network on the test data.
a) Protocol: After training and validating our net-
works, we tested each of them on the corresponding test data
set composed of 100 positive and 100 negative instances.
The aim of this simulation is to evaluate the accuracy
achieved on the test set and to identify and understand the
potential weaknesses of the system by examining the cases
on which the system returned a wrong output. The output
layer of the network has two nodes, one activated when the
network believes a weapon is present, and one activated
when the network believes a weapon is absent. Since the
last layer is a softmax, the total activation of the layer is
one. The threshold for weapon detection is set at 0.5. If the
output of the node for the presence of a weapon is greater
than 0.5, then we have a positive output; otherwise, we have
a negative output.
b) Results: Table I reports the absolute detection values
on positive and negative samples for each component net-
work along with the relative accuracy, precision and recall.
TABLE I: Detection performance for each network of each
component.
Part name Pos. set Neg. set Accuracy Precision Recall
Stocks TP: 97FP: 3
TN: 78
FN: 22 0.875 0.97 0.815
Magazines TP: 81FP: 19
TN: 84
FN: 16 0.825 0.81 0.835
Barrels TP: 99FP: 1
TN: 54
FN: 46 0.765 0.99 0.683
Receivers TP: 82FP: 18
TN: 95
FN: 5 0.885 0.82 0.943
* Note: TP stands for true positives, FP for false positives, TN for true
negatives, and FN for false negatives.
The network responsible for the detection of receivers
achieved 95% accuracy when tested against negative sam-
ples, but performed slightly worse in detecting the actual
receivers achieving 82% accuracy. The network responsible
for the detection of magazines achieved 84% accuracy
against the negative samples and 81% accuracy in detect-
ing magazines (positive samples). The network trained on
barrels correctly classified 54% of the negative samples,
and performed remarkably well in detecting barrels with an
accuracy of 99%. The results of the network responsible
for the detection of the stocks gave an 78% accuracy in
classifying correctly negative samples and 97% accuracy in
detecting stocks.
c) Discussion: Overall, the performance of the individ-
ual networks is satisfying, with an accuracy ranging between
75 and 90 percent. Notice that the strength of our system
relies not only on the performance of the individual networks
but also on the ensembling of the results of all networks.
For instance, assume that the system is set up to raise a
positive detection alert if at least two of the networks output
a positive signal; assume also that the average accuracy on
positive samples is 0.8 (as in our simulations); then, the
overall probability of the system of missing a positive sample
is given by the probability of three individual networks of
making a mistake in recognizing a positive sample, that is,
(1 − 0.8)3 = 0.008; the overall system may then reach an
accuracy up to 0.992 in detecting positive samples2. This
result is consistent with the ensemble theory discussed in
Section III.
B. Simulation 2: Evaluation of semantic segmentation
In the second simulation, we further assess the behaviour
of the individual neural networks assembled into a coherent
system and provide a proof of concept for the principle
of semantically decompositon of the problem of weapon
detection.
a) Protocol: We tested the reliability of the system by
feeding images (from the datasets) of AR-15 style rifle on
a noisy neutral background (e.g., an image of a concrete
surface). We selected a high-quality image of the weapon
and we artificially produced different sets of transformed
images, such as rigid transformations of the weapon (change
of orientation, scale and location) and ablative transforma-
tions of the weapon (removal and occlusion of component
parts). We ended up working with both images of single
component parts and images of the whole rifle. In total,
we generated 14 random images that allow us to evaluate
both the performance of individual networks (as we did in
the previous simulation) and the performance of the whole
system. For a sample of a used image, the background, and
a sample ablative transformation, see Figure 4.
The setup of this simulation allows us to evaluate the
performance of the network independently of possible con-
founding elements in the background. In other words, it
allows us to assess whether the networks are able to identify
their target component both in an ideal setting and under
several challenging transformations of the weapon.
We evaluate the results of our simulations by assessing
the detection and segmentation performance of our system.
The detection is evaluated by checking whether a specific
network (in case of an image of a component) or the
2Notice, though, that this value of accuracy is an upper bound based
on simplifying assumptions, such as the assumption of independence of
the outputs of each network and the assumption that each part is always
detectable from each image. Such assumptions are likely not to hold in
real-world scenarios.
Fig. 4: Source image, background and a sample combined
test image.
ensemble system (in case of an image of the whole weapon)
produce a positive output. The segmentation is evaluated by
computing a bounding box and checking it against a manu-
ally defined ground-truth bounding box. A segmentation is
deemed successful if the area of the bounding box covers
the firearm or all visible parts. If the bounding box is clearly
outside of the boundaries of the firearm or if it is covering a
sizeable non-firearm area, then the segmentation is deemed
unsuccessful.
b) Results: Testing 14 images, the system correctly
detected the presence of a weapon, without generating any
false negatives. The segmentation was also satisfactory, with
the system successfully placing a bounding box over the
firearm despite different orientations, scaling and part com-
binations. Figure 5 shows different sample bounding boxes
computed by the system on components that are part of the
rifle. Similarly, Figure 6 shows the overall bounding box
computed on an image of a rifle by aggregating individual
bounding boxes. Notice that the end parts, such as the barrel,
while correctly identified by the individual network, were
sometimes not covered in the aggregated bounding box. The
reason for that is that the aggregation algorithm weighted
more overlapping areas such as the central parts of the
weapon.
c) Discussion: The results of this simulation are very
encouraging: even though these tests were conducted on san-
itized images in which potential distractors were removed,
they demonstrate that the array of networks is robust enough
in detecting parts of a weapon under different transforma-
tions. Removing certain parts of the rifle proves the main
strength of our solution based on a set of semantic networks:
even when some parts of a firearm object are obscured or
concealed, our system can still detect the presence of the
firearm as long as at least some of the predefined parts are
present. This makes our system suitable for deployment in
Fig. 5: Results of the segmentation on sanitized images. The
green bounding box is the manually labeled area, whereas
the blue bounding box is the area detected by the networks.
Fig. 6: Bounding box computed by aggregation of the
outputs from individual networks. The green bounding box
is the manually labeled area, whereas the blue bounding box
is the area detected by the networks.
environments where detecting concealed firearms in a rapid
manner can mitigate potentially harmful events.
C. Simulation 3: Evaluation on realistic video frames
In this simulation we assess the accuracy of our system
by processing images obtained from a custom video stream
rather than images obtained from the Internet.
a) Protocol: We processed a video stream containing a
single standing person holding a AR-15 rifle. The subject is
holding the rifle in three possible positions (low, medium and
high). For each position, we extract 16 images showing the
person holding the rifle in different degrees of rotation. The
clothing of the subject and the background in the images are
neutral to ensure that the rifle does not explicitly blend with
the surroundings or the person. In total, we processed 48
sample images in which the weapon is presented in different
rotation angles, and also situations in which certain parts of
the rifle are obscured by the subject’s clothing or the way
the weapon is held.
Similarly to previous simulations, we evaluate our results
by computing the detection accuracy and presenting the
bounding boxes of the identified objects. For each testing im-
age, we provided a ground-truth bounding box by manually
identifying the area in a frame where the rifle or parts of the
rifle were visible. We quantitatively computed the overlap
between the true bounding box and the predicted bounding
box by evaluating the intersection between the true bounding
box over the union of the bounding boxes computed by each
one of our component networks.
b) Results: Table II reports the number of correct
detections of the network and the number of instances
where the computed bounding box overlapped at least 50
per cent the true bounding box. Images where the subject
was holding the rifle at a low position, were successfully
detected 13 times out of 16, even when the overlapping of
bounding boxes was low (4 out of 16 with 50% or more
overlap). Images where the subject was holding the rifle at a
medium position, performed slightly worse, with our system
correctly classifying 10 out of 16 samples, whereas there
was an improvement in accuracy of the segmentation boxes
with 6 out of 16 boxes overlapping equally or more than
50%. Finally, images where the subject was holding a rifle
at a higher position our system achieved higher accuracy
by correctly classifying 15 out of 16 images. In addition,
9 out of 16 images had their computed bounding boxes
overlapping for 50% or more with the true bounding boxes.
TABLE II: Detection and segmentation performance on the
simulated video data
Position Detection Overlap over 50%
Low 13 / 16 4
Medium 10 / 16 6
High 15 / 16 9
Figure 7 shows a a successful detection with an accu-
rate computed bounding box. Figure 8 shows the case of
a successful detection, but where the bounding box was
mistakenly computed and included the head of the person
holding the weapon.
c) Discussion: In this simulation, the system had the
task of identifying a AR-15 rifle held by a person. Besides
different orientations and angles, this scenario takes into
consideration concrete distractors, such as the person itself
and its clothes. The results showed that semantic segmen-
tation modelling is indeed promising in detecting a firearm
Fig. 7: Result of the simulation testing with rifle being held
in “high” position. The green bounding box is the manually
labeled area, whereas the blue bounding box is the area
detected by the networks.
Fig. 8: Result of the simulation testing with rifle being held
in “low” position. The green bounding box is the manually
labeled area, whereas the blue bounding box is the area
detected by the networks.
in different angles and positions, but nevertheless, it is still
prone to misclassifying objects that bear similar color or
shape to the ones that have been used to train the model.
For instance, the misclassification of the black balaclava as
shown on Figure 8 suggests that the negative set used during
the training should include a wide variety of images to cover
all possible situations and environmental features such as
clothing, headwear and background details.
VII. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Use of machine learning in safety-critical situations raises
ethical questions about the uses and potential misuses of
learning algorithms. In our case, while our aim was to
develop an effective system that may be used to help security
personnel in detecting threatening situations in civil society
and in intervening more promptly to prevent loss of lives,
we are aware that our system may be tuned and deployed in
other scenarios; in particular, it is not far-fetched to see its
use within lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS). The
authors, however, discourage and condemn the use of their
system in autonomous weapons3.
To prevent our system from making decision au-
tonomously, we also considered a potential extension, in-
cluding a human-in-the-loop. In the context of critical AI
systems designed to make potentially dangerous decisions,
a simple solution adopted to prevent catastrophic errors is
offered by integrating a human overseer in the decision loop
of the machine [24], [25]. We considered the implementation
of a human-in-the-loop system both at training time and at
test time. During training, such an approach would allow a
human supervisor to check and correct the actual decision of
the system, it would allow the detection of common mistakes
and biases in the network, and it would make it possible
to transfer human insights by providing a stronger learning
signal to the machine. After deployment, a human overseer
would check and validate the outputs of the network and
would be responsible and accountable for the final decision.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered the problem of detecting the
presence of weapons within images or video frames. We
suggested a solution based on machine learning techniques
and the principle of semantic decomposition of the problem.
Instead of implementing a single complex learning module
which would require large amounts of data and high compu-
tational resources, we proposed the use of multiple simple
neural networks that could be cheaply trained to detect only
specific components of a weapon and which could be easily
aggregated to produce robust output. We tested our model
on data from the same distribution as the training data (i.e.,
Google images), we examined it on synthetic sanitized data,
and we evaluated it on out-of-sample (i.e., video frames)
data. The results showed the reliability of the individual
component part networks and the versatility of the overall
system in integrating the outputs of the single networks.
While promising, our results are still preliminary and
different directions of future developments are left open.
From a practical point of view, the system may be further
refined by generating more extensive and representative data
sets and by considering additional components of a rifle.
Another obvious extension would be to enlarge the set of
detected objects from the simple AR-15 model to other
rifles or, even, other weapons, such as knives. The process
of aggregating the outputs of individual networks could be
refined as well. In this work, we proposed a simple majority
rule, and we suggested in passing other potential rules.
However, the problem of producing a single output may be
more formally expressed in probabilistic terms, and we could
exploit other statistical models to generate outputs reporting
not only a final decision but their uncertainty, as well. This
work could better reconnect our research to the theory of
ensemble learning as well.
3https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/
Most importantly, we are considering the development of
a thorough comparison between our semantic segmentation
approach and standard approaches presented in the litera-
ture and based on a single deeper neural network able to
identify at once the presence of weapons in an image. A
fair comparison is far from trivial, as it would require the
training of models with similar capacity and using equally
informative data sets. We are designing such experiments
with the aim to precisely evaluate the strengths and the
weaknesses of the two approaches in terms of accuracy,
confusion matrices, and training cost in terms of number
of samples and computational time.
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